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Abstract 
 
The analysis of bank failures enables the construction of models responsible for 
an earlier detection from banks with a high probability of being unsound, allowing a 
preventive behavior. Therefore, this paper uses first a data set of Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured U.S. banks from 2000 to 2014, in order to 
understand the most relevant indicators when it comes to explain bank failures. Results 
were then compared with those from a special sub-sample, called “crisis sample”, which 
comprises the period of more failures, from 2008 to 2014. In addition to the indicators’ 
proposal, combining CAMEL and non-CAMEL ones, applying the Principal 
Components Analysis and the Logistic Regression also allowed to discover that 
CAMEL indicators have a quite consistent role when it comes to explain bank failures 
during periods of financial instability. The increasing of the impact of Management 
Quality factor during the financial crisis should also be noticed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of banking system is quite determinant, especially when it comes to a 
nation’s economic growth and development. This phenomenon is more visible during a 
crisis, as it was example the subprime, when a considerable number of banks failed.  
The beginning of the subprime crisis was firstly related to the inflation in the 
housing market, since people had to apply higher mortgages. Then, it was offered a 
subprime rate to people who didn’t fulfill the requirements (a riskier process) of the 
prime one, enabling them to afford the house anyway. Consequently, and because of the 
easiness of meeting the conditions to get the lending, an increase in homeownership was 
generated. However, the strong decrease of house prices as of 2006 led banks to 
bankruptcy. 
Crisis, such as the one mentioned above, motivate, on the one hand, supervisors 
and regulators and, on the other hand, researchers to study even more how to predict 
and avoid failures or, at the same time, how to minimize its impacts. 
The assessment of bank’s financial health can be done over two different 
perspectives: on-site and off-site examinations.  
The first one, which involves all kinds of banks operations, is quite expensive, 
which means it is hardly applied with a suitable frequency.  However, it doesn’t mean 
that on-site examinations are not applied to evaluate the soundness of banking 
institutions. They are and, as a result, they culminate with the attribution of a CAMELS 
rating. The rating varies between 1 and 5, where 1 and 2 illustrate low failure likelihood 
and 3, 4 and 5 the opposite. A bank’s poor rating will result in regulatory measures and, 
if it is not enough, a failing bank letter will be sent to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) by the regulator, starting a resolution. 
After requesting loan and deposit data and visiting the bank in order to collect 
information, in person, FDIC has to decide which resolution structure it should opt for. 
Although the most applied one is purchase and assumption, in which bank’s assets and 
liabilities are auctioned, there is also deposit pay off. FDIC only uses to select the 
second one when there are no bidders available.  
In contrast, off-site monitoring is essentially supported by financial statement data 
and regulatory reports, which reduces the process cost. As a result, a more 
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comprehensive number of banks have the possibility to be supervised and with a higher 
frequency. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research - based on an off-site perspective - is to 
understand which variables explain bank failures in the U.S., using recent data and 
specific bank variables from FDIC database. The option for the U.S. market is 
connected to three arguments: the preponderance of its economy, the quantity of banks 
and the availability of its default information when comparing to any other country. 
Moreover, this research contributes to the existing literature through the 
parallelism or aggregation of four purposes. The first one is the fact that it has been 
triggered from the connection of a comprehensive literature on banking bankruptcy. The 
second is related to the combination of methodologies applied, Principal Components 
Analysis and Logit model. The third one is based on the type of data that is used, 
specific bank information collected from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). The last one is the period of time covered by the study, a more comprehensive 
and, at the same time, recent one. 
This research comprises a whole sample, from 2000 to 2014, and a special sub-
sample, called “crisis sample”, from 2008 to 2014. 
Finally, in this study were used CAMELS and non-CAMELS variables. The 
acronym stands for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings 
Ability, Liquidity and Sensitivity to Market Risk. The Non-CAMELS group comprised 
measures such as credit risk, profitability, tax, growth and size. 
Results from the whole sample period highlighted that the ratios of Equity to 
Total Assets, Net operating Income to Assets, Interest Expense to Interest Income, Net 
Loans and Leases to Deposits, Noncurrent Assets plus Other Real Estate Owned to 
Assets, Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities, both belonging to the CAMEL group are 
quite relevant to explain bank failure. Furthermore, the non-CAMEL ratios of Net 
Interest Income to Total Assets (representing Profitability) and Loan Loss Allowance to 
Total Assets (representing Credit Risk) also have an important role to explain bank 
default. The non-CAMEL ratio of Bank Size is still considered. 
Besides, results from the “crisis sample” demonstrate the prominence of CAMEL 
indicators when it comes to explaining bank failures associated to the last financial 
crisis in U.S., given the focus of the explanatory power in these variables. Moreover, the 
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demand of a good management during the period of financial instability is also 
something to take into consideration and which is properly explained during this 
investigation. 
Lastly, a final remark is given related to the capability of the indicators selected 
by the methodology to represent a wider dimension of information. 
 
The reminder of this research proceeds as follows. The next section presents the 
literature review. The third section deals with methodology, incorporating also data and 
some issues about the variables. Then, section four presents the empirical results. Finally, 
the last section summarizes and concludes the findings of this study. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The study of bank failure prediction requires a consistent basis of available 
information. Probably economic and financial crisis are the most powerful sources of 
applicable knowledge when it comes to understand how to minimize its own 
consequences. 
However, these complex phenomenons also allow the development of literature 
on banking with the addition of new perspectives and conclusions. Fahlenbrach et al. 
(2012), for example, classified poor stock return performance of a bank, over the 1998 
crisis, as a powerful predictor of poor performance and as a way of forecast a failure 
during recent financial crisis. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) connected the impact of governance and regulation to 
the credit crisis and found that banks with better governance and more fragile financing 
had a worse performance during the crisis. 
Falenbrach and Stulz (2011) also analyzed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
incentives in the perspective of the credit crisis. They found no evidence that a better 
alignment between the interests of CEOs and shareholders would lead to higher bank 
stock returns. In fact, they found the opposite. 
Lastly, Aebi et al. (2012), addressing an issue related to the corporate governance 
structure, found that when the Chief Risk Officer reports directly to the board of 
directors, banks have a better performance during credit crisis. 
As it was highlighted there are several studies and preponderant conclusions 
arising from bank failure literature and it was only made reference to a few authors 
related to this perspective. 
 
In fact, the literature on bank failure prediction and its accuracy has recently 
become much broader, including a diversity of failure prediction models. Some of them 
are going to be explored below.  
In spite of the increasing concern about bank distress, firms’ failure forecast dates 
back to 1960s, when Beaver (1966), one of the first researchers to study bankruptcy 
prediction, presented a univariate approach of discriminant analysis in order to 
investigate the predictive ability of financial ratios. 
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Nonetheless, his work was extended by Altman (1968), who, using a multivariate 
discriminant analysis, assessed the relationship between failure and five financial 
indicators: working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets, market value of equity to total debt and sales to 
total assets. 
Although the use of discriminant analysis has dominated researches until the end 
of 1970s, a new approach was coming. The most intrinsic reason was the fact that 
model bases, such as financial data normally distributed and equality of variance-matrix 
of failed and non-failed banks, were often being violated (Taran, 2012). 
 Thus, Martin (1977), examining commercial banks introduced the logit model. 
This methodology, which has associated more than one period of observations, was 
proved to have a better predictive power than, for example, Discriminant Analysis and 
other one-period models. 
However, focusing on Martin’s (1977) work, he started with twenty-five variables 
which were allocated to four groups: asset quality, liquidity, capital adequacy and 
earnings. His final model only had four ratios, which were represented by asset quality, 
capital adequacy and earnings groups.  
Avery and Hanweck (1984), in their research, reinforce the group classification 
made by Martin (1977). Barth et al. (1985) suggest an extension to the model, with the 
use of liquidity. In their study, liquidity was estimated by the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets and by the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Graham and Horner (1988) refer the influence of an adequate management and, 
following them, Thomson (1991), with a logit model prediction, evaluated and proved 
that bank failure is a consequence of the five factors, adding management quality as the 
fifth factor. 
Despite the successive and progressive conclusions from authors, related to the 
influence and significance of variables linked to the factors quoted above, U.S. 
regulators had already introduced the CAMEL rating system in order to assess 
individual banks’ health. 
At this moment, it is more intuitive that the acronym CAMEL stands for Capital 
adequacy (which shows the extent to which banks are able to absorb losses), Asset 
Quality (which includes risk diversification; a note for the fact that holding inferior 
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quality assets means being more vulnerable to losses), Management Quality (which 
takes into account the productivity and the management competence as the inverse of 
failure likelihood; a note for the fact that Management Quality being a hard factor to 
quantify), Earnings Ability (which have an ambiguous interpretation: a high operational 
performance vs. a high portfolio risk, however the sustainability of profits is also taken 
into account) and Liquidity (a low level is risky against a considerable deposit 
withdrawal but, on the other hand, a high level means poor management), however it 
somehow has evolved into CAMELS, which includes the addition of Sensitivity to 
Market Risk (which shows the impact on banks from, for example, fluctuations in the 
financial market), addressed by a few researchers. 
Returning to methodologies, logit models are proved to have a good performance 
when it concerns to failure prediction and they are still very used in the modern 
literature, being Estrella et al. (2000), Arena (2008) and Andersen (2008) examples of 
that. The last one was focused, once again, on the determination of the best predictors of 
banks failure but, this time, on a Norwegian perspective.   
In fact, following the vast literature, logit as well as probit models are able to 
predict banks’ failure probability, having diverse authors that discuss and test which one 
best succeeds. 
Despite forecasting the probability of bank failure, they don’t determine exactly 
the moment of failure. Nevertheless, Cox (1972) proposed a solution, Cox proportional 
hazards model which following Ploeg (2010) have a similar predictive power. 
Hazard analysis was used by several authors, such as Shumway (2001), who 
demonstrated that this methodology outperforms the traditional models, or Wheelock 
and Wilson (2000). Arena (2008), mentioned above, used both logit and hazard models 
to investigate bank failures in East Asia and Latin America.  
In addition, many more predictive models co-exist. Kolari et al. (2002), for 
example, use logit and trait recognition, a nonparametric approach described as useful 
on small samples, to predict large U.S. commercial bank failures, based on data from 
one year and two years prior to the failure. They find that trait recognition could be a 
notorious early warning system for large failing banks. On the other hand, Lanine and 
Venet (2006) extend both methodologies to the Russian context and conclude that 
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although logit and trait recognition perform well, in this context the second outperforms 
the logit model.  
Another model is the called neural networks, firstly used for bankruptcy 
classification by Odom and Sharda (1990), who used the variables found as significant 
by Altman (1968) and infer that it, at least, was as precise as discriminant analysis. 
However, Tam and Kiang (1992) were the first to apply this methodology to banks’ 
failure prediction. Furthermore, Celik and Karatepe (2007) also applied this model, but 
to the Turkish case. 
 
Recently, Mayes and Stremmel (2013), with data from 1992 to 2012 from the 
FDIC for the US, analyzed the performance of different indicators of capital adequacy. 
Using at first a logit approach and then a Cox proportional hazard estimation, they 
found that the leverage ratio outperform risk-weighted capital. Furthermore, the 
leverage ratio, which is a better indicator because it is harder to manipulate, has best 
results when it comes to complex banks. 
Sy et al. (2011), using a Cox proportional hazards model (and a probit model as a 
benchmark), added non-CAMEL variables extracted from Bankscope database, such as 
bank’s business structure indicators, off-balance sheet items, derivative investments and 
credit risk, to assess bank performance. Focusing on nine Central and East Asian 
countries, they identified a predictive power associated to bank’s derivative investments 
and credit risk. However, they also realized that business structure ratios and off-
balance sheet items don’t fit the sample predictive function. 
Jordan et. al. (2010) argue that bank’s failure risk can be detected up to four years 
prior to failure, since, with a multiple discriminant analysis, their study enabled them to 
predict US bank failures (for banks which failed between February 2, 2007 and April 
23, 2010 and data from FDIC web site) with 66 % accuracy four years prior to failure, 
71,4 % three years prior to failure, 78,6 % two years prior to failure and 88,2 % one 
year prior to failure. Moreover, they proved that the seven indicators referred below can 
be used to predict bank failure: ratio of non-interest income to interest income, ratio of 
non-accrual assets plus owned real estate “ORE” to total assets, ratio of interest income 
to earning assets, ratio of Tier One capital to total assets, Bank Holding Company 
dummy variable representing whether or not the bank is part of a holding company, 
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Savings Bank dummy variable representing whether or not the bank is a savings bank 
and MSA dummy variable representing whether or not the bank is located in a 
“Metropolitan Statistical Area”. Finally, they found that the ratio of real estate loans as 
a percentage of total assets is a strong predictor of bank failure. 
Vilén (2010) conducted a study on U.S. Commercial Banks, from 2004 to 2009, 
with total assets worth more than 500 million dollars, whose variables were collected 
from FDIC database. The author started with thirty two variables and after performing 
the Student’s t-test and single variable logit analysis there were only twenty five 
independent variables. However, there was still the need to solve the multicollinearity 
problem whereas the final model included the following variables: nonaccrual rate, loan 
diversification, return on equity, capital growth, tax exposure, CMO ratio, uninsured 
deposits, risk free securities, dividend rate, loan growth, assets variation and liquid 
assets. Consequently, the author referred that previous researches’ findings are still 
applicable on bank’s failure prediction. 
Poghosyan and Cihák (2009) carried out a research in European Union (EU-25) 
with financial data from Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database and NewsPlus 
database for the period of 1997-2007. They started with CAMEL factors and then they 
added others related to: depositor discipline, contagion effects, macroeconomic 
environment, banking market concentration and financial market. Using several 
versions of the logistic probability model, they found that the probability of default is 
negatively associated with the level of capitalization and earnings. Furthermore, they 
argue that the probability of default is inversely related to asset quality whereas 
management quality and liquidity seem not be significant. Finally, they concluded that 
contagion effects are important when predicting EU bank failures, in other words, it 
means that bank’s default probability is higher if there is a recent failure in a bank with 
similar size in the same country; and that stock prices may be relevant when one’s 
addressing bank’s default likelihood. 
Montgomery et al. (2005) addressed Japan and Indonesia perspective with a logit 
analysis on financial ratios of commercial banks, whose data came from balance sheets 
and income statements. They used the following ratios: capital to deposits, equity to 
deposits, loans to equity, loans to capital, fixed assets to equity, fixed assets to capital, 
total equity capital to assets, return on equity, return on assets, liquid assets-shot term 
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borrowing to total deposits, equity to risk assets, loans to assets, treasury securities to 
assets, other securities to assets, capital to assets, core deposits to total liabilities, non-
performing loans to total loans and total loan to total deposit. Consequently, they found 
the ratios loans to deposits and loans to total assets as the most significant when doing 
the forecasting of both countries’ bank bankruptcy. In the Indonesia case the ratio non-
performing loans to total loans has predictive power, as well. 
 
In summary, it’s explicit that there’s a diversity of methodologies coexisting, 
which are applied to different sets of countries. Databases vary according to the selected 
country and the period of time is also changeable.  
Nevertheless, independent variables are, maybe, the most ambiguous determinant. 
Although CAMEL factors are globally accepted as decisive when predicting bank 
failure, ratios that represent each factor are still something that don’t gather total 
consensus. Furthermore, as it was verified, there are authors that inclusive add non-
CAMEL variables, something that this research will follow.  
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3. Methodology 
This section provides useful information related to the bank sample, the source of 
data, variables definitions, combination of methodologies applied and reasons why each one 
was selected. 
Methodology chapter proceeds as follows: first, Data and Sample, then, Variables, 
and, finally, Model Specifications. 
 
3.1 Data and Sample 
This paper uses reports from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
statistics on depository institutions (SDI), available on its website. In addition, data 
were collected on an annual logic, from 2000 to 2014, covering only FDIC insured 
institutions.  
Information for indicators calculation was obtained from the following global 
items: Assets and Liabilities, Income and Expense and Performance and Condition 
Ratios. 
The number of failed banks per year, throughout the investigation period, is 
shown in Table I. 
 
Table I: Number of Failed Banks per Year 
 
2000 
 
 
7 
 
 
2001 
 
 
4 
 
 
2002 
 
 
11 
 
 
2003 
 
 
3 
 
 
2004 
 
 
4 
 
 
2005 
 
 
0 
 
 
2006 
 
 
0 
 
 
2007 
 
 
3 
 
 
2008 
 
 
25 
 
 
2009 
 
 
140 
 
 
2010 
 
 
157 
 
 
2011 
 
 
92 
 
 
2012 
 
 
51 
 
 
2013 
 
 
24 
 
 
2014 
 
 
18 
 
 
Total 
 
 
539 
 
 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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Furthermore, the study comprises a dataset of 11.121 banks, which represents, 
during the whole sample period, a total of 128.261 observations, while “crisis sample”, 
a sub-sample from 2008 to 2014, represents a total of 54.411 observations. It’s also 
reasonable to point out that the number of banks is not constant over time, there are, as 
expected, market entries and exits.  
 
3.2 Variables 
In this investigation CAMELS and non-CAMELS variables will be used. 
Therefore, each one of the following factors is going to be represented by one or more 
indicators: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings Ability, 
Liquidity and Sensitivity to Market Risk. Besides, the non-CAMELS group comprises 
measures such as credit risk, profitability, tax, growth and size. 
The dependent variable, based on the group of explanatory variables selected from 
the literature, represents the probability of bank failure. 
There are two common strategies that can be applied when it involves variables. 
The first one consists on selecting a small set of variables which were indicated by 
earlier studies as being relevant. The second one, on the other hand, starts with a wide 
set of explanatory variables, including a more comprehensive list of risk factors (Ploeg, 
2010).  
This research follows the second strategy, applying a methodology in order to 
shorten the variables list - Principal Components Analysis - something that will be 
explained later. 
Indicators presented in Table II were collected from the literature (Altman et al., 
2014; Betz et al., 2014; Halling and Hayden, 2007; Mayes and Stremmel, 2013; Ploeg, 
2010; Vilén, 2010; Wang and Ji, (unspecified)).  
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Table II: Variable Definitions 
 
Source of the Definitions: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Group 
Designation 
Indicators 
Formula with  
FDIC Codes 
Definitions 
(C)apital 
Adequacy 
 
Equity/Total Assets EQV  
 
Equity/Liabilities EQTOT / LIAB  
 
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio
1 RBC1RWAJ 
1 Tier 1 capital as a percent of 
risk-weighted assets. 
Capital (Leverage) Ratio
2 
RBC1AAJ 
2 Tier 1 capital as a percent of 
average total assets minus 
ineligible intangibles. 
(A)sset 
Quality 
 
Return on Assets ROA  
Noncurrent Assets
3
 plus Other Real Estate 
Owned/Assets 
NPERFV 
3 Assets that are past due 90 days 
or more plus assets placed in 
nonaccrual status. 
(M)anagement 
Quality 
 
Net Interest Income/Number of Employees NIM / NUMEMP  
 
Risk-weighted Assets Adjusted/Total Assets RWAJT / ASSET  
Efficiency Ratio
4 
EEFFR 
4 
Noninterest expense less 
amortization of intangible assets 
as a percent of net interest 
income plus noninterest income. 
(E)arnings 
Ability 
 
Interest Expense/Interest Income EINTEXP/INTINC  
 
Return on Equity ROE  
Net Interest Margin
5 
NIMY 
5 Total interest income less total 
interest expense as a percent of 
average earning assets. 
 
Net Operating Income/Assets
6 NOIJY 
6 Net operating income as a 
percent of average total assets. 
(L)iquidity 
 
Net Loans and Leases/Total Assets LNLSNTV  
 
Interest Expenses/Total Liabilities EINTEXP / LIAB  
 
Net Loans and Leases/Deposits LNLSDEPR  
 
Domestic Deposits/Total Assets DEPDASTR  
(S)ensitivity  
 
Volatile Liabilities/Assets VOLIAB / ASSET  
Non-CAMELS 
 
Loan Loss Allowance7/Total Assets LNATRES / ASSET 
7 Reserve for loan and lease 
losses that is adequate to absorb 
estimate credit losses associated 
with loan and lease portfolio. 
 
Net Interest Income/Total Assets NIM / ASSET  
 
Cash Dividends/Total Assets EQCDIV / ASSET  
 
Applicable Income Taxes/Total Assets ITAX / ASSET  
Capital Growth 
 
[(EQTOT - EQTOT(-1)) / 
EQTOT(-1)] x 100 
 
 
Loan Growth 
 
[(LNLSNET - LNLSNET(-1)) / 
LNLSNET(-1)] x 100 
 
 
 
Bank Size Ln (ASSET)  
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3.3 Model Specifications 
Seeing that at the beginning a vast number of explanatory variables will be 
contemplated, one would say that it could lead to the multicollinearity problem, due to 
the probability of existing high correlations between variables. 
In this research work, Principal Components Analysis will be applied with the 
ambition of minimizing redundant information. Therefore, it’s expected that it leads to 
the most comprehensive variables when it comes to explain banks’ failure. Furthermore, 
the principal components are not correlated, reducing the multicollinearity problem. 
This method will be used first for CAMELS indicators and then it will be applied 
to non-CAMELS ones. 
 
As it was mentioned before, after Martin (1977), logit model, became a widely 
applied methodology, especially when it concerns to literature about failure prediction 
and banking supervision (Andersen, 2008; Arena, 2008; Betz 2014; Li, 2013; Ploeg, 
2010). 
Consequently, and once it doesn´t assume multivariate normality among 
independent variables, which is a benefit since bank data uses to be not normally 
distributed (Vilén, 2010), the logit model will be applied in this research. 
The utilization of logistic regression analysis implies that the failure probability 
relies on a vector of independent variables (Vilén, 2010; Ploeg, 2010). Moreover, the 
value of dependent variable varies between 1, for failed banks, and 0, for non-failed 
ones, since the model is characterized by being based on a cumulative function.  
To sum up, in the proposed Logit models, the dependent variable is based on a 
group of explanatory variables selected from the literature and screened through a 
technical filter (Principal Components Analysis). 
 
Associated to the logistic regression, standard errors are going to be estimated 
using Huber/White (QML) method. Thereby, standard errors are robust to certain 
misspecifications of the distribution from the dependent variable. 
 
Following the results from Principal Components Analysis and applying the 
remaining methodology described above, equations will be first estimated with only 
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CAMELS and then also with non-CAMELS indicators. The more complex model, as it 
was said before, is the principal focus of this research, in order to gather the most 
efficient set of indicators to explain bank failures. 
Finally, the last results will be compared with the period in which failures number 
was higher. 
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4. Empirical Results 
Empirical Results comprise the analysis procedure and the results of the 
investigation, in other words, the explanation of the indicators’ screening process, the 
analysis of full sample results, looking for the most reliable indicators to explain bank 
failure, and the comparison with the sub-sample ones. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, Principal Components Analysis, then, Logit 
Regressions and analysis to the whole sample, and, finally, Logit Regressions and analysis 
to the “crisis sample”. 
 
4.1. Principal Components Analysis 
The indicators’ screening process, Principal Components Analysis, is going to be 
explained below. 
All the CAMELS indicators (eighteen), which were selected from the literature, 
were included in the first analysis. Only the first seven principal components have an 
eigenvalue higher than 1.00, which together explain over 65 % of the total variability in 
the data. 
Thus, the indicators’ selection was made according to the following order: Equity 
to Total Assets (C), Net Operating Income to Assets (E), Interest Expense to Interest 
Income (E), Net Loans and Leases to Deposits (L), Net Interest Income to Number of 
Employees (M), Noncurrent Assets plus Other Real Estate Owned to Assets (A) and 
Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities (L). 
The indicators’ selection was made, all along this procedure, by choosing the 
indicator with higher loading, on each principal component. 
In conclusion, the first stage of the Principal Components Analysis culminated in 
seven indicators: one from Capital Adequacy, one from Asset Quality, one from 
Management Quality, two from Earnings Ability and two from Liquidity. 
On the other hand, the non-CAMELS indicators (seven) were included in a 
second analysis, isolated from the CAMELS ones. After the application of the same 
procedure used in the first analysis, only the first three principal components have an 
eigenvalue higher than 1.00 and together these explain more than 56 % of the total 
variability in the data. 
16 
 
Up to now, the non-CAMELS indicators collected from this analysis have been 
the following: Net Interest Income to Total Assets, Bank Size and Capital Growth. 
However, total variability explained by the two next components is so similar to 
the last one selected that it was decided to take the two associated indicators to the 
equation’s estimation phase, as well. Therefore, the five principal components explain 
over 83 % of the total variability in the data. 
Finally, the two additional indicators were Loan Growth and Loan Loss 
Allowance to Total Assets. 
 
4.2. Logit Regressions and analysis to the whole sample 
Table III shows results from three logit regressions, whose main objective is to 
understand which variables explain banks’ failure (data from 2000 to 2014). Equation 1 
represents the estimation of a first model, which only includes CAMELS indicators. In 
Equation 2, three other indicators were added, a result from the methodology above 
explained. Moreover, Equation 3 results from the addition of two more “other 
indicators”, following the reasons given above, as well. 
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Table III: Logit Regressions applied to the whole sample 
 
 
Top number is the coefficient, bottom number is the p-value, and *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 2.1 Equation 3 Equation 3.1 
CAMELS Indicators      
Constant 
 
-1,050277 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-2,407274 
(0,0009)*** 
-1,665367 
(0,0317)** 
-2,594043 
(0,0042)*** 
-1,658302 
(0,0329)** 
Equity to Total Assets 
 
-0,727173 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-0,748189 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,723298 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,715763 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,687288 
(0,0000)*** 
Net Operating Income to 
Assets 
 
-0,239284 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-0,218578 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,231961 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,200369 
(0,0000)*** 
-0,205044 
(0,0000)*** 
Interest Expense to Interest 
Income 
 
0,998911 
(0,0000)*** 
 
0,876480 
(0,0000)*** 
0,909980 
(0,0000)*** 
1,051057 
(0,0011)*** 
0,854507 
(0,0000)*** 
Net Loans and Leases to 
Deposits 
 
-5,31E-0,6 
(0,0560)* 
 
5,01E-0,6 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-1,26E-0,5 
(0,0000)*** 
 
3,57E-0,6 
(0,0081)*** 
 
-1,25E-0,5 
(0,0001)*** 
 
Net Interest Income to 
Number of Employees 
 
-1,78E-0,6 
(0,2855) 
 
-0,000668 
(0,0000)*** 
- 
-0,000538 
(0,0170)** 
- 
Noncurrent Assets plus Other 
Real Estate Owned to Assets 
 
0,150049 
(0,0000)*** 
 
0,146751 
(0,0000)*** 
0,146951 
(0,0000)*** 
0,127304 
(0,0000)*** 
 
0,124194 
(0,0000)*** 
 
Interest Expenses to Total 
Liabilities 
 
0,030378 
(0,0948)* 
 
 
36,82906 
(0,0000)*** 
 
 
8,080554 
(0,0000)*** 
 
 
35,33310 
(0,0000)*** 
 
 
10,63981 
(0,0000)*** 
 
Other Indicators      
Net Interest Income to Total 
Assets 
 
-26,90044 
(0,0000)*** 
-32,78557 
(0,0001)*** 
 
-31,31569 
(0,0068)*** 
 
-43,86838 
(0,0000)*** 
Bank Size  
0,138815 
(0,0070)*** 
0,121001 
(0,0182)** 
 
0,121244 
(0,0307)** 
 
0,097362 
(0,0690)* 
Capital Growth  
-0,001003 
(0,2711) 
- 
 
-0,000874 
(0,2675) 
 
- 
Loan Growth     
 
-0,000524 
(0,4773) 
 
- 
Loan Loss Allowance to 
Total Assets 
   
 
25,81164 
(0,0001)*** 
 
32,03025 
(0,0000)*** 
      
 
McFadden R-squared 
 
0,642378 0,660913 0,648699 0,664497 0,653780 
 
Akaike info criterion  
 
0,021914 0,022458 0,021548 0,022383 0,021257 
 
Schwarz criterion 
 
0,022614 0,023507 0,022334 0,023630 0,022131 
 
Log likelihood 
 
-1194,134 -1107,886 -1175,243 -1095,051 -1158,244 
 
LR statistic 
 
4289,923 4318,745 4340,317 4337,720 4374,315 
 
Prob(LR statistic) 
 
0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 
 
Obs with Dep=0 
 
109189 99121 109390 98487 109390 
 
Obs with Dep=1 
 
527 523 528 523 528 
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According to the results presented in Table III related to Equation 2, one realizes 
that all indicators, but Capital Growth, are statistically significant (at the 1% level). 
Therefore, Capital Growth indicator was removed. However, this removal contributed 
to a new not statistically significant indicator, Net Interest Income to Number of 
Employees.  
Results from a second estimation are now presented in Equation 2.1. It shows six 
CAMEL indicators, both statistically significant at the 1% level, and two others, one 
statistically significant at the 5% level in a unilateral test and one statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
Following the same logic than before from Equation 3 to Equation 3.1, once all 
indicators but Loan Growth and Capital Growth had revealed to be statistically 
significant (all but Net Interest Income to Number of Employees and Bank Size at the 
1% level), at the beginning Loan Growth was removed and then Capital Growth. 
However, after a new estimation one could verify that with the removal, Net Interest 
Income to Number of Employees indicator wasn’t statistically significant anymore. 
Then, the process was repeated and this indicator was removed. 
 Consequently, final results, covering six CAMEL indicators, both statistically 
significant at the 1% level, and three other ones, two statistically significant at the 1% 
level and one statistically significant at the 10% level in a unilateral test, are presented 
in the column of Equation 3.1. 
 
The next stage is based on the analysis of Equation 2.1 and Equation 3.1, once, as 
it was explained above, both represent the final regression models, for the whole sample 
period. Table IV will be closely observed during the interpretation. 
 
In both equations, the coefficient value of Equity to Total Assets is negative, as it 
was expected from the literature review. This means that a higher ratio reflects greater 
ability from banks to protect themselves against financial losses (loan losses or 
decreases in value of assets), resulting on a lower probability of bank failure. 
The ratio Net Operating Income to Assets exhibits a negative coefficient, which 
follows the literature and means that a higher level of earnings decreases the probability 
of default. 
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Table IV: Summary of the Expected Influence from the Explanatory Variables 
 
 
Interest Expense to Interest Income has a positive coefficient as it was predicted. 
It suggests that unsound banks have less ability to generate profits on interests, which 
increases the probability of default. 
The coefficient of Net Loans and Leases to Deposits ratio presents a negative 
value. This finding is inconsistent with the literature, which argues that a higher value 
of the indicator may be connected with a lack of liquidity in order to face unforeseen 
obligations, increasing the probability of default. However, if the value of the ratio is 
too low, it could also mean that banks may not be earning as much as it is 
recommended. Thereby, a higher value of this indicator would result in a lower 
probability of default. 
The positive coefficient of the Noncurrent Assets plus Other Real Estate Owned 
to Assets ratio is consistent with the investigation preliminary assumptions.  It means 
that unsound banks usually have more non-performing loans, so that they are more 
likely to fail. 
 
Indicators 
 
Influence Source 
CAMELS Indicators   
 
Equity to Total Assets 
 
- Betz et al. (2014); Wang and Ji (unspecified) 
 
Net Operating Income to 
Assets 
 
- Mayes and Stremmel (2013) 
 
Interest Expense to Interest 
Income 
 
- Wang and Ji (unspecified); Ploeg (2010) 
 
Net Loans and Leases to 
Deposits 
 
+ Mayes and Stremmel (2013) 
 
Net Interest Income to Number 
of Employees 
 
- Halling and Hayden (2007) 
 
Noncurrent Assets plus Other 
Real Estate Owned to Assets 
 
+ Mayes and Stremmel (2013) 
 
Interest Expenses to Total 
Liabilities 
 
+ Betz et al. (2014) 
Other Indicators   
 
Net Interest Income to Total 
Assets 
 
- Wang and Ji (unspecified) 
 
Bank Size 
 
? Wang and Ji (unspecified); Ploeg (2010); Li (2013) 
 
Capital Growth 
 
- Vilén (2010)  
 
Loan Growth 
 
- Vilén (2010) 
 
Loan Loss Allowance to Total 
Assets 
 
? Li (2013), Ng and Roychowdhury (2014),  Wang and Ji (unspecified) 
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Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities ratio also measures the cost of funds. 
Moreover, a higher value reveals problems in maintaining liquidity, which has led 
banks to take more significant risks. Consequently, banks with a higher value of this 
ratio are more likely to fail. 
The coefficient value of Net Interest Income to Total Assets ratio is negative in 
both equations, following the literature. It also supports the thesis that sound banks have 
a greater ability to generate net interest income from its own assets, reducing their 
probability to get in trouble. 
In spite of the inconclusive relation from literature between Bank Size and its 
failure probability, Equations 2.1 and 3.1 have a positive coefficient related to this 
indicator. At first sight, one would argue that large banks should have better diversified 
portfolios and then be less likely to fail. However, results show that maybe big banks 
are involved in risky lending activities, which had led them to huge losses. 
Literature about the influence of Loan Loss Allowance to Total Assets ratio is 
also ambiguous, stating that, on the one hand, a higher value of this indicator means that 
banks are more prepared to loan default risks and, on the other hand, a higher value 
suggests that banks are expecting to experience significant cash flow losses related to 
their loan portfolios, results from Equation 3.1 are unequivocal. The positive sign from 
the coefficient supports the second perspective and shows that unsound banks have 
higher values of this ratio than the remaining ones. 
 
4.3. Logit Regressions and analysis to the “crisis sample” 
Equations 2.2 and 3.2, in Table V, result from Equations 2 and 3, respectively, but 
now the period of time analyzed varies between 2008 and 2014 since, as it is visible in 
table I, it was when the major number of failures occurred. Therefore, the main goal is 
to understand the most significant changes in terms of explanatory factors.   
As a result, the two equations in the next table represent final solutions, after the 
removal of all statistically non-significant indicators.  
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Table V: Logit Regressions applied to the “crisis sample” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top number is the coefficient, bottom number is the p-value, and *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Equation 2.2 presents six CAMEL indicators which are statistically significant at 
the 1% level and two non-CAMEL indicators, which are only statistically significant at 
the 10% level in a unilateral test. 
 
Indicators 
 
Equation 2.2 Equation 3.2 
CAMELS Indicators   
Constant 
 
-0,013305 
(0,9798) 
 
-0,895633 
(0,0001)*** 
Equity to Total Assets 
 
-0,769666 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-0,782785 
(0,0000)*** 
Net Operating Income to 
Assets 
 
-0,253396 
(0,0000)*** 
 
-0,257710 
(0,0000)*** 
Interest Expense to Interest 
Income 
 
0,940155 
(0,0000)*** 
 
1,008179 
(0,0000)*** 
Net Loans and Leases to 
Deposits 
 
-1,07E-0,6 
(0,0000)*** 
 
- 
Net Interest Income to 
Number of Employees 
- 
 
-4,26E-0,6 
(0,0805)* 
 
Noncurrent Assets plus Other 
Real Estate Owned to Assets 
0,097471 
(0,0000)*** 
 
0,101659 
(0,0000)*** 
 
Interest Expenses to Total 
Liabilities 
 
37,89336 
(0,0000)*** 
 
 
39,24315 
(0,0000)*** 
 
Other Indicators   
Net Interest Income to Total 
Assets 
 
-29,11883 
(0,0674)* 
 
 
- 
Bank Size 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
Capital Growth 
 
-0,000713 
(0,0821)* 
 
- 
Loan Growth   
 
- 
 
Loan Loss Allowance to 
Total Assets 
 
 
- 
 
   
 
McFadden R-squared 
 
0,695189 0,693254 
 
Akaike info criterion  
 
0,037813 0,037920 
 
Schwarz criterion 
 
0,039626 0,039329 
 
Log likelihood 
 
-804,6644 -809,9515 
 
LR statistic 
 
3670,431 3661,025 
 
Prob(LR statistic) 
 
0,000000 0,000000 
 
Obs with Dep=0 
 
42555 42607 
 
Obs with Dep=1 
 
481 481 
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Equation 3.2 presents six indicators, belonging all of them to the CAMEL group. 
Furthermore, all of them, but Net Interest Income to Number of Employees (statistically 
significant at the 10% level in a unilateral test), are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
The coefficients sign from each indicator, in Equations 2.2 and 3.2, is the same 
which was verified before and was properly justified.  
Nevertheless, in Equation 2.2, one of the statistically significant indicators at the 
10% level (in a unilateral test) is a new one. Capital Growth indicator follows also what 
was expected from the literature, in other words, results allocate a negative sign to the 
coefficient, which means that banks with growing capital are usually in a better 
condition, keeping them off from a failure situation. 
In Equation 3.2, the new indicator is Net Interest Income to Number of 
Employees, which is essentially an efficiency ratio. The higher the net interest result per 
employee is, the higher the efficiency of the bank and, as it is visible from the results, 
the lower the probability of failure. The arising of this indicator may be connected to the 
necessity of an efficient management during the period of financial crisis, as it was 
verified by Halling and Hayden (2007). 
Finally, the prominence of CAMEL indicators must be highlighted when it comes 
to explaining bank failures associated to the last financial crisis in U.S., once it becomes 
more evident the concentration of the explanatory power in these variables, during the 
period of a higher number of bank defaults. In particular and dissecting Equation 3.2, it 
has one indicator from Capital Adequacy (Equity to Total Assets), one from Asset 
Quality (Noncurrent Assets plus Other Real Estate Owned to Assets), one from 
Management Quality (Net Interest Income to Number of Employees), two from 
Earnings Ability (Net Operating Income to Assets and Interest Expense to Interest 
Income) and one from Liquidity (Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities). 
It also must be said that the resultant models incorporate very complete indicators. 
In addition to the five factors of CAMEL, which were stated in the last paragraph, Net 
Loans and Leases to Deposits was also used to represent the Credit Risk dimension in 
other studies. Moreover, Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities was used by Hasan et al. 
(2014) to represent Sensitivity to Market Risk, as well.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The recent financial turmoil has triggered so many significant losses for financial 
institutions and countless bank failures that it could only result in reexaminations of 
important issues, such as performance and soundness of banks, from academic and 
policy-makers. 
This research focuses on obtaining the most efficient set of indicators to explain 
bank failures in the U.S. and in order to accomplish that it comprises a whole sample, 
from 2000 to 2014, and a special sub-sample, called “crisis sample”, from 2008 to 2014. 
Through a different combination of methodologies, thereby using the Principal 
Component Analysis and the Logistic Regression, and joining CAMELS with non-
CAMELS indicators such as credit risk, profitability, tax, growth and size measures, 
this study goes further than the existent literature. 
One of the main reasons behind the analysis of bank failures is the construction of 
models which are able to earlier detect signs of banks with a high probability of being 
unsound, allowing regulators to act in a preventive way against the damages in the 
economy. 
Regression results from the whole sample period highlighted that the ratios of 
Equity to Total Assets, Net operating Income to Assets, Interest Expense to Interest 
Income, Net Loans and Leases to Deposits, Noncurrent Assets plus Other Real Estate 
Owned to Assets, Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities, both belonging to the CAMEL 
group, are quite relevant to explain bank failure. Furthermore, the non-CAMEL ratios of 
Net Interest Income to Total Assets (representing Profitability) and Loan Loss 
Allowance to Total Assets (representing Credit Risk) also have an important role on 
explaining bank default. The non-CAMEL ratio of Bank Size is still considered. 
Moreover, the results from the “crisis sample” point out to the prominence of 
CAMEL indicators when it comes to explain bank failures associated to the last 
financial crisis in the U.S., given the concentration of explanatory power in these 
variables. 
Besides, the arising of Net Interest Income to Number of Employees indicator 
(representing Management Quality) may be connected to the demand of a good 
management during the period of financial instability. 
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Finally, indicators resulting from final solutions are quite robust in terms of the 
diversity of information explained.  
In this investigation, the effects of macroeconomic variables and financial market 
indicators weren’t taken into consideration due to the complexity of data collection. 
However, it’s something that, added to the present results and work concept, probably 
deserves further research. 
One other way, may be connected to the adaptation of the work concept used, 
putting indicators which came from the results, the most relevant to explain bank 
failures, in a predictive basis model and so trying to understand its predictive power 
(from one to four years before, for example). 
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